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PROTECTING THE PUBLIC BENEFIT: CRAFTING
PRECEDENT FOR CITIZEN ENFORCEMENT OF
CONSERVATION EASEMENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
In fiscal year 2004, Wal-Mart added 139 new discount stores, supercenters, and
“neighborhood markets” to its already significant chain of stores across the United
States.1 Wal-Mart developers submit their proposals to governing town bodies all over
the country with the promise that the $20 million construction of a 200,000 square foot
store will create 500 new jobs for the local economy, will have a payroll of over $12
million, will increase the tax base of the area, and will provide convenient, affordable
shopping for consumers. For these reasons, the big box stores are a hard offer for town
planners to resist, and they often accept the stores with open arms, seeing them as a
way to “put life back into the community” or to offer more shopping choices for their
“underserved” town. Yet the proliferation of Wal-Marts and other stores contribute
dramatically to problems of urban sprawl, traffic congestion, disappearance of green
space, and loss of small businesses, and often come with many hidden costs, both
economic and environmental.2
In the face of this development pressure, there is a legal tool that many private
parties, local communities, and even states and the national government are using to
conserve land: the conservation easement.3 Across the nation, small non-profit land
trusts have sprung up in local communities; these land trusts have been aggressively
pursuing conservation easements to conserve open space, preserve agriculture land,
protect watersheds, and other conservation purposes.4 In addition, many communities

1. WAL-MART, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 20 (2005). According to its Annual Report, Wal-Mart’s net
sales topped $256 billion in fiscal year 2004. Id. at 16.
2. Wal-Mart is the “most frequently sued company on the planet, averaging 15 lawsuits against it
every day.” Carl Steidtmann, Break it Up, PROGRESSIVE GROCER, Feb. 15, 2005. The company is currently
a defendant in numerous class actions brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act and state laws. WALMART, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 48 (2005). The company is also a defendant in a class action brought by
female employees for gender discrimination. Id. In order to help boost the public perception of Wal-Mart,
the company recently announced “Acres for America,” a program that will fund land conservation projects
throughout the United States. See Edward D. Murphy, Wal-Mart Land Program Aids Maine, PORTLAND
PRESS HERALD, April 13, 2005.
3. A conservation easement is generally described as follows:
“a nonpossessory interest of a holder in real property imposing limitations or affirmative
obligations the purposes of which include retaining or protecting natural, scenic, or openspace values of real property, assuring its availability for agricultural, forest, recreational,
or open-space use, protecting natural resources, maintaining or enhancing air or water
quality, or preserving the historical, architectural, archaeological, or cultural aspects of real
property.”
UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 1 (1981). Although different states use slightly different
terminology, including conservation easements, conservation servitudes, and conservation restrictions, the
terms are used interchangeably throughout this Note, there being little or no difference between one name
and the others.
4. Because of the tax-exempt status of most land trusts and because of the tax benefits that can be
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have incorporated conservation easements into their comprehensive plans, often
requiring developers, for example, to grant a conservation easement to the town as part
of a subdivision proposal.5 Even state governments have increasingly used conservation easements to protect large swaths of land, engaging in lengthy and complex land
transactions.6
But what happens if the town is the holder of a conservation easement on a parcel
of land and that parcel is threatened by the very development that the town wants to
welcome and encourage? What should happen if the town refuses to enforce the
easement against the developer? Are there appropriate legal structures in place to
ensure that the easement is enforced? Or should courts grant broader enforcement
power to the public, as primary beneficiaries of conservation easements, in order to
secure proper enforcement: a power of citizen enforcement? While there is significant
debate about the certainty of conservation easements to last in perpetuity, the fact
remains that there are already thousands of conservation easements in this country and
the pace of conservation easement growth will likely only increase in the coming years.
Stronger enforcement mechanisms are necessary now in order to protect the public
benefit. All conservation easements have an important public interest at stake, and the
public cannot take the risk that this interest will be lost forever if enforcement actions
cannot be brought by parties willing to protect the publicly subsidized investments.
Given the lack of litigation surrounding conservation easements up to this point,
every court decision handed down offers a chance to evaluate the strength of the instruments, how they will be interpreted in a judicial context, and what the effective theories
are for enforcement of conservation values. Due to the statutory nature of the
easements, and because the language of the statutes vary from state to state, there exists
an opportunity to discuss the desirability of certain provisions over others. Although
different theories have been advanced that would give effect to various avenues of

achieved from donating a conservation easement, land trusts usually make reference to one or more of the
“conservation purposes” that define a “qualified conservation contribution” in the tax code. See I.R.C. §
170(h) (2005). See also LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, LAND TRUST STANDARDS AND PRACTICES 8 (2004),
available at http://www.lta.org/sp/index.html (“For land and easement projects that may involve federal
or state tax incentives, the land trust determines that the project meets the applicable federal or state
requirements, especially the conservation purposes test of IRC § 170(h).”).
5. See, e.g., YARMOUTH, ME., 1993 COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF YARMOUTH, MAINE, available at
http://www.yarmouth.me.us/ (follow “Comprehensive Plan” hyperlink). The Town’s Comprehensive Plan
explains:
Instead of purchasing all the rights to a piece of property, the Town is encouraged to acquire
conservation easements on valued lands when appropriate . . . . The flexibility of the
conservation easement as a tool for land preservation makes it attractive to the property
owner as well as the Town. The Council recommends that the Town consider conservation
easements as a way to preserve open space and scenic views while saving public acquisition
dollars.
Id. at 23.
6. Some examples of these state programs can be found in Maine, which has the Land for Maine’s
Future Program (http://www.state.me.us/spo/lmf); New Hampshire, which started the Land and Community
Heritage Investment Program (http://www.lchip.org); and Vermont, which has the Vermont Housing and
Conservation Board (http://www.vhcb.org). These programs provide funding and varying levels of
oversight for land conservation projects throughout their respective states.
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enforcement by different parties, often it will come down to an interpretation of the
language of a specific state statute to determine who has standing to enforce.
This Note begins with a brief introduction to the law of conservation easements.
It then discusses some of the existing case law dealing with issues of standing and
“citizen-enforcement.” The Note then examines how one court dealt with the problem
of standing to enforce a conservation easement in Tennessee. Finally, the Note
analyzes the effect that this decision and others like it could potentially have on the law
of standing to enforce conservation easements, with suggestions for several frameworks that could justify giving standing to citizens seeking to enforce conservation
easements.7
II. CONSERVATION EASEMENTS: A GENERAL OVERVIEW
Conservation easements have been increasingly seen as valuable tools to protect
publicly important land. They have been the subject of a great deal of academic
discussion recently, so this overview will be brief.8 There are many benefits that flow
to both a landowner and to the public as a result of granting conservation easements.
The landowner is typically encouraged by the possibility of tax benefits, both at the
state and federal level.9 She has the comfort of knowing that an important piece of land
will be protected from development “in perpetuity.” She also has the flexibility to
create an instrument that imposes the restrictions and obligations appropriate for the
situation. On the other hand, the public enjoys the protection of scenic views,
agricultural pastures, open spaces, and other valuable lands that would otherwise be

7. Not dealt with in this Note is the fact that in most states there is no standardized system for
recording or documenting conservation easements, leading to thousands of easements with little or no
public oversight or public knowledge of location, size, or accessibility for recreational uses.
8. There are a number of good sources for learning the basics of conservation easements. See, e.g.,
Melissa Waller Baldwin, Conservation Easements: A Viable Tool for Land Preservation, 32 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 89 (1997) (describing the general nature of conservation easements and the benefits of
using easements for land conservation); Federico Cheever, Public Good and Private Magic in the Law of
Land Trusts and Conservation Easements: A Happy Present and a Troubled Future, 73 DENV. U. L. REV.
1077 (1996) (describing the land trust movement in general and the public/private relationship of
conservation easements); Andrew Dana & Michael Ramsey, Conservation Easements and the Common
Law, 8 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 2 (1989) (describing the common law background of the law of conservation
easements, the land trust movement, and the legal ramifications of conservation easements lasting “in
perpetuity”); Melissa K. Thompson & Jessica E. Jay, An Examination of Court Opinions on the
Enforcement and Defense of Conservation Easements and Other Conservation and Preservation Tools:
Themes and Approaches To Date, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 373 (2001) (summarizing much of the case law
concerning the enforcement and defense of conservation easements).
9. Unfortunately, some of the federal tax benefits that now exist may be scaled back in coming years.
A recent report by the Joint Commission on Taxation recommended “reforming” a number of the tax
incentives that result from conservation easement donations. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
109TH CONG., OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES 277 (Comm.
Print 2005), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/ s-2-05.pdf. The recommendations in the report include
disallowing tax deductions for contributions of conservation easements on personal residences, and
reducing the available deduction for other conservation easements to thirty-three percent of the appraised
value of the easement, among other things. Id. at 284-87. But see Nancy A. McLaughlin, Increasing the
Tax Incentives for Conservation Easement Donations—A Responsible Approach, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1
(2004) (discussing abuse in the conservation easement context, but advocating a “responsible” approach
to increasing the tax incentives offered to easement donors).
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subject to development pressures.10 As conservation easements are a relatively new
tool, it is important to engage in an analysis of their ability to be controlling in
“perpetuity,” their strength in the face of challenges and enforcement actions in court,
and their effectiveness in delivering public conservation benefits.11
Although conservation easements are, generally speaking, statutory creations, they
did not develop in a legal vacuum—they have traceable roots in the common law of
both property and contracts.12 Almost all of the states now have adopted so-called
“enabling statutes,” which explicitly allow for the creation of conservation easements.13
Many of these statutes are modeled on the Uniform Conservation Easement Act
(UCEA), adopted in 1981,14 although there is still a great lack of uniformity from state
to state. A conservation easement donor essentially gives up certain rights of the
proverbial “bundle of sticks”—often the development rights to the property.15 The
identity of an entity that can hold a conservation easement (a “holder”) varies from

10. Many states have different names for restrictions depending on their purposes, such as conservation,
agricultural preservation, watershed preservation, etc. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 31
(West 2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 477:45 (West 2001). For purposes of this Note, these distinctions
are disregarded, as they are usually treated fairly equally under the respective state laws.
11. Apart from the legal academic debate over the policy surrounding conservation easements, some
practices have increasingly come under public scrutiny. For example, the Washington Post has done a
number of stories that called into question certain practices by the nation’s largest land trust, The Nature
Conservancy, as well as stories about exploitation of the tax incentives of conservation easements by greedy
developers. See Joe Stephens & David B. Ottaway, Nonprofit Sells Scenic Acreage to Allies at a Loss;
Buyers Gain Tax Breaks With Few Curbs on Land Use, THE WASHINGTON POST, May 6, 2003, at A01; Joe
Stephens & David B. Ottaway, Developers Find Payoff in Preservation; Donors Reap Tax Incentive by
Giving to Land Trusts, but Critics Fear Abuse of System, THE WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 21, 2003, at A01.
This exposure, in part, led the IRS to issue a notice in June of 2004 explaining that it intended to disallow
any improper deductions as a result of suspect transactions. I.R.S. Notice 2004-41, 2004-28 I.R.B. 31.
12. See generally, Gerald Korngold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes: A Policy Analysis in the
Context of in Gross Real Covenants and Easements, 63 TEX. L. REV. 433 (1984) (arguing that the term
“easement” may be a misnomer, as the servitudes have more in common with real covenants than with
traditional easements, and that blending these two historically distinct bodies of law can implicate important
policy concerns).
13. Twenty-two states have adopted the Uniform Conservation Easement Act, and twenty-five others
have enacted enabling laws other than the Uniform Act. Roderick H. Squires, Introduction to Legal
Analysis, in PROTECTING THE LAND: CONSERVATION EASEMENTS PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 72-73 (Julie
Ann Gustanski & Roderick H. Squires eds., 2000).
14. UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT (1981).
15. The UCEA does provide that conservation easements can impose both “limitations” and/or
“affirmative obligations.” UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 1(1) (1981). Other state enabling
statutes are not quite as broad, generally referring only to limitations or restrictions. See, e.g., CAL. CIV.
CODE § 815.1 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 241 of 2005 Reg. Sess. urgency legislation & Governor’s
Reorganization Plans No. 1 & 2 of 2005) (conservation easement “means any limitation in a deed, will, or
other instrument”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 184 § 31 (West 2004) (explaining “[a] conservation restriction
means a right . . . to permit public recreational use, or to forbid or limit any or all” specified activities); 32
PENN. STAT. ANN. § 5002 (West, Westlaw through Act 2005-58) (“[Open space benefits are] benefits . . .
which result from the preservation or restriction of the use of selected predominantly undeveloped open
spaces or areas.”). One major concern, however, is the fact that many conservation easements may give up
little or no meaningful development rights—for example, a “working forest easement” that gives up some
rights to build upon the land but has no limit on the amount of timber harvesting that is permitted. E-mail
from Jeff Pidot, Chief of the Natural Resources Division, Maine Attorney General’s Office, to Sean Ociepka
(June 16, 2005) (on file with author).
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state to state, but holders generally fall into one of two categories: governmental bodies
and charitable organizations.16 Most conservation easements are either required or at
least permitted to last “in perpetuity,” meaning that questions about the continuing
validity of conservation easements are bound to arise well into the future.17
Considering the perpetuity of conservation easements, it is important that the legal
foundation of their ability to be enforced be certain.
III. EXISTING ENFORCEMENT CASE LAW
Existing case law concerning conservation easement enforcement is sparse. Most
cases brought thus far have been initiated by either the holder of the conservation
easement or the owner of the burdened parcel of land.18 Although all of these cases can
provide important glimpses into the way courts may handle disputes over such
easements, the selected cases that follow may help to shed light on the issue of
standing, and serve as precedent, both good and bad, for future arguments surrounding
citizen enforcement of conservation easements.
In the relatively early Massachusetts case of Knowles v. Codex Corp.,19 a group
of citizen plaintiffs sued Codex Corporation on a number of counts, including violation
of a conservation easement.20 In return for the town’s rezoning of a piece of property
for business use by Codex, it agreed to place a conservation restriction on a number
of acres on the parcel of land it wanted to develop.21 The restriction was granted to the
town’s conservation commission, which was given authority to enforce its terms in the
instrument.22 Codex’s actual plans differed slightly from what it had represented to the
citizens of the town, and after Codex starting developing the land, a group of citizens
brought suit.23 The Massachusetts Court of Appeals held that the citizens did not have
standing to bring suit, as that authority was specifically vested in the town’s
conservation commission in both the restriction instrument and by statute.24 This case

16. UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 1(2) (1981) (defining a “holder” as “a governmental body
empowered to hold an interest in real property” or “a charitable corporation, charitable association, or
charitable trust,” which has conservation purposes). Some state statutes make explicit reference to the
Internal Revenue Code when defining a “holder” for the purposes of the law. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
10, § 821(c) (LexisNexis 1998) (defining a holder as a governmental body or a conservation organization
qualifying under § 501(c)(3) or 501(c)(2) of the I.R.C.).
17. UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 2(c) (1981) (“A conservation easement is unlimited in
duration unless the instrument creating it otherwise provides.”).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Ponte, 246 F. Supp. 2d 74 (D. Me. 2003) (action by holder, the federal
government, seeking enforcement); Bennett v. Comm’r of Food and Agric., 576 N.E.2d 1365 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1991) (action brought by owner of burdened land seeking authorization to construct a residence on the
property); Chatham Conservation Found., Inc. v. Farber, 779 N.E.2d 134 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002) (action
brought by holder of an easement seeking enforcement); Goldmuntz v. Chilmark, 651 N.E.2d 864 (Mass.
1995) (action by owner of burdened land seeking authorization to build an in-ground swimming pool);
Southbury Land Trust v. Andricovich, 757 A.2d 1263 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000) (action by holder land trust
seeking enforcement).
19. 426 N.E.2d 734 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981).
20. Id. at 735.
21. Id. at 735-36.
22. Id. at 736.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 737-38. The citizens apparently relied on the United States Supreme Court cases of Sierra
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was decided prior to the adoption of the UCEA, and prior to the more recent explosion
of conservation easement use; the public policy surrounding the use of conservation
easements has certainly changed a great deal since 1981, and a court might well be
more receptive to broader standing arguments today, given the widespread recognition
of public benefit.25
Determining who has standing to enforce a conservation easement was exactly the
issue that the Connecticut Superior Court faced in the 1995 case of Burgess v.
Breakell.26 A landowner, Burgess, sued his neighbor, Breakell, to enforce a conservation restriction on the Breakell’s property. The restriction required the property to
be maintained in a “wild, natural and semi-natural open space for scientific, educational, scenic, environmental, aesthetic and cultural purposes, for the preservation of
its natural features.”27 The restriction also prohibited commercial logging, which
Breakell allegedly commenced nonetheless.28 The holder of the restriction was the
Connecticut Conservation Commission (CCC), a nonprofit organization; Burgess was
not named either as a holder or as a party with enforcement rights in the restriction
instrument.29 Breakell filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that Burgess had no
standing to enforce the restriction because he was not the holder.30 Burgess argued that
nowhere in the Connecticut statute did it say that one needed to be a holder of a
conservation restriction in order to enforce it.31 The court found that the Connecticut
statute was vague on this point, and noted that Connecticut courts had not previously
ruled on the question of who may enforce these restrictions.32 The court went on to say
that because the Massachusetts statute “closely resemble[s]” the Connecticut statute,
Massachusetts case law may be used to offer guidance in interpretation.33

Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) and United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973). Id. at 737 n.13.
Morton is discussed infra notes 136-41 and accompanying text.
25. Massachusetts is largely recognized as one of the leading states, historically speaking, as far as
conservation easement use is concerned. See, e.g., Cheever, supra note 8, at 1080 (“Although almost all
states now have some form of conservation easement or restriction legislation, the oldest identifiable
‘conservation easement’ statutes were adopted in Massachusetts in 1956 and California in 1959.” (citations
omitted)). “Private land trusts are older than conservation easements, but not much older. Founded in 1891,
Massachusetts' Trustees of Reservations is probably the oldest private land trust in the United States.” Id.
at 1085.
26. No. CV-95-0068033, 1995 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2290 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 7, 1995).
27. Id. at *1.
28. Id. at *1-2. Interestingly enough, in many recent landscape-wide conservation easements, protecting sometimes hundreds of thousands of acres, holders actually acquire what are known as “working forest
easements,” which allow traditional logging activities and associated practices, but limit development in
other ways. See LAND FOR MAINE’S FUTURE PROGRAM, DRAFTING GUIDELINES FOR WORKING FOREST
EASEMENTS FUNDED BY THE LAND FOR MAINE’S FUTURE PROGRAM (2002), available at
http://www.state.me.us/spo/lmf/publications/ (last visited April 5, 2005).
29. Burgess v. Breakell, 1995 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2290, at *2.
30. Id.
31. Id. at *4.
32. Id. at *5.
33. Id. The finding of the court that the Connecticut statute closely resembled the Massachusetts
statute is, at the very least, debatable. Compare, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 184, § 31 (West 2003), with
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47-42a (West 2004).
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The court relied on language from the Massachusetts case of Bennett v.
Commissioner of Food & Agriculture,34 which stated that the intent of the legislature
was that the holder of the restriction be the only party with enforcement power.35
Therefore, the CCC, as holder of the restriction, was the only party that could enforce
it, and the plaintiff lacked standing to bring the current action.36 This case provides a
good example of a state court trying to sort through, for the first time, what it means
to enforce a conservation restriction. It shows that enabling statutes often provide little
guidance when trying to resolve a dispute, and therefore a reliance on public policy
arguments, clearly drafted language, and other conservation easement precedent may
sway the court one way or another. A question remains whether the court would have
come out differently if the language of the document said that the neighbor did have
enforcement powers.37
Another Connecticut case, Conrad v. Mattis,38 presents what could be a fairly
typical dispute among neighboring landowners whose respective properties are subject
to a conservation easement. As part of a developer’s subdivision plan, the town of
South Windsor required a conservation easement be placed on certain portions of each
property.39 The two parties to the dispute were subsequent purchasers of the subdivided
property, and the back half of each property was subject to a conservation easement.40
Over the years, the neighbors apparently feuded over alterations to the landscape,
allegedly in violation of the terms of the easement.41 Then one day, one of the
neighbors decided that he had had enough, and sued after the abutting neighbor cleared
some trees and shrubs in order to put in a vegetable garden.42 The Town was holder of
the easement, but the abutting neighbor alleged that it refused to enforce its terms.43
The defendants apparently raised the issue of standing, but by the time the case came

34. 576 N.E. 2d 1365 (Mass. 1991).
35. Id. at 1367-68. Although this interpretation by the Connecticut court is certainly valid, it is by far
not the only interpretation. The Massachusetts court was not squarely presented with the issue of standing
in Bennett, and its comments were clearly dicta (the case was an appeal of an administrative decision, so
standing was freely granted to the landowner who was seeking relief from the Commissioner’s decision).
Id. at 1367. In fact, the Bennett court spoke broadly of the important public policy values inherent in
conservation issues and explicitly declined “to apply common law rules requiring privity of contract or
estate and that the party seeking to enforce a servitude have an interest in land benefited by it.” Id.
36. Burgess v. Breakell, 1995 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2290, at *8. The CCC filed a motion to intervene,
which was not ruled on in this opinion. The CCC also filed a separate action, which is unreported.
37. One commentator suggests how the court could have reached a different result: “In the case of
unclear statutory language, the court could have looked to federal environmental laws and cases for
guidance on the issue of standing, rather than the laws of Massachusetts.” Thompson & Jay, supra note 8,
at 377. She offers that this approach may have been more consistent with the conservation purposes set out
in the statute. Id. Further, she states that there is little doubt that the adjacent landowner was harmed by the
commercial logging venture, and the public benefit was also likely impaired. Id. See also UNIF.
CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 1 cmt. (“Under this Act, however, Owner could not grant a similar
[enforcement] right to Neighbor, a private person. But whether such a grant might be valid under other
applicable law of the adopting state is left to the law of that state.”).
38. No. CV000595954S, 2000 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3594 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 2000).
39. Id. at *3.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at *4.
43. Id. at *1.
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to trial the issue was either waived or had not been pressed.44 Thus, unfortunately, the
case does not provide any precedent on the issue of standing by a non-holder neighbor.
On the other hand, it does provide a glimpse into a case that could well become the
norm: a conservation easement granted upon subdivision of land, which is held by a
town that for many reasons may not want to enforce the terms of the easement against
feuding neighbors. At that point, there may be no one left to defend the conservation
values but a motivated landowner who would not, absent a broad theory of standing,
have the power to enforce in court.
Throughout these cases, we see state courts trying to piece together some sort of
theory for enforcement of conservation easements, often in the face of unclear statutory
language, little or no relevant precedent, and drafting practices that did not do enough
to make enforcement power clear in conservation easement instruments.45 What
follows is a discussion of a recent case that took an expansive view of citizen-standing
power, following a broadly written statute that evidenced a legislature recognizing the
important public benefits that flow from valid, enforceable conservation easements.
IV. TENNESSEE ENVIRONMENTAL COUNCIL V. BRIGHT PAR:
THE LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION MODEL
In early 2003, the Tennessee Environmental Council46 asked the State’s Department of Environment and Conservation (DEC) to review plans for a proposed WalMart Supercenter, focusing on the potential for the destruction of wetlands.47 The DEC
agreed to a review of the plans and impacts of the development.48 The development
plan called for a road to be put in through existing wetlands.49 A few weeks later, a
dozen citizens appeared at a Chattanooga City Council meeting to oppose the development, arguing that it would destroy wetlands and green space, hurt nearby businesses,
and conflict with a town plan that called for green space on the area.50 Undeterred (or
perhaps rushed by the show of opposition), construction on the site began near the end
of June, 2003.51 Soon after, a few Earth First! activists chained themselves to
construction equipment at the site as a way of protesting the development, arguing that
the site was one of the last green spaces in the community and that “it [was] used as a
migratory stop for 180 species of birds in Tennessee, about 45% of the total population

44. Id. at *2.
45. It is common, however, for well-drafted easements to have very detailed language about
enforcement powers, as it is often in the interests of all parties involved to have those powers clearly
delineated.
46. The Tennessee Environmental Council is a nonprofit organization founded in 1970 whose mission
is to “educate and advocate for the protection of Tennessee’s environment and public health.” Tennessee
Environmental Council Website, http://www.tectn.org (last visited Jan. 16, 2005).
47. Will Callaway, Letter to the Editor, Don’t Let Wal-Mart Destroy Greenspace, CHATTANOOGA
TIMES FREE PRESS (Tenn.), May 30, 2003, at B6.
48. Id.
49. Duane W. Gang, Residents Protest Proposed Wal-Mart, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS
(Tenn.), June 11, 2003, at B5.
50. Id.
51. Mike Pare, Wal-Mart Work Begins at Disputed Brainerd Location, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE
PRESS (Tenn.), July 21, 2003, at C1.
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of birds in Tennessee.”52 The Wal-Mart in Brainerd would be the twelfth Chattanoogaarea supercenter.53
The DEC examined the site and uncovered violations of a water discharge permit
that it had issued to the developers, finding that “erosion control measures were not
properly installed” and that “a sediment treatment system for water pumped out of a
detention basin was not constructed as designed.”54 The developer worked to fix the
violations, and also hired an environmental consultant to work with it throughout the
project, giving the consultant the power to halt work in the future if problems arose.55
Then, in July of 2003, the Tennessee Environmental Council, along with the group
Citizens for Responsible Progress56 and citizen Sandy Kurtz, sued Bright Par 3
Associates,57 seeking an injunction to stop the development of the new Wal-Mart
Supercenter.58 The Council alleged that the development property, owned by Bright
Par, was adjacent to wetland and conservation easement areas that drained directly into
the South Chickamauga Creek, that the development would result in illegal discharges
into the Creek and/or illegal alteration of the protected areas, and that site preparation
had already damaged the areas.59
On July 7, 2003, a temporary restraining order was issued and a hearing was
scheduled in the Chancery Court for Hamilton County.60 Bright Par “filed motions to
dissolve the temporary restraining order, alleging that the [Council could not] succeed
on the merits, that there [was] no imminent threat of irreparable injury to the
[individuals] or to the protected areas, and that the proposed injunction [was] contrary
to the public interest.”61 At a hearing on July 15, 2003, the only issue that was heard

52. Three Anti-Wal-Mart Protestors Out on Bond, One Still Held, THE CHATTANOOGAN.COM, June
27, 2003, http://www.chattanoogan.com/articles/article_38125.asp (last visited Feb. 27, 2005). The activists
were charged with criminal trespassing. Id.
53. Kimberly Starks, Mountain Creek Residents Upset Over Wal-Mart Plan, CHATTANOOGA TIMES
FREE PRESS (Tenn.), July 30, 2004, at B1.
54. Mike Pare, Court Temporarily Halts Wal-Mart Project, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS (Tenn.),
July 8, 2003, at B1. In May of 2004, Wal-Mart settled with the Environmental Protection Agency for $3.1
million for violations of the Clean Water Act as a result of excessive stormwater runoff from its construction
sites. Wal-Mart Fined Over Violations, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS (Tenn.), May 13, 2004, at C1.
The settlement cited violations at over twenty-four construction sites in nine states. Id. The construction
at the Brainerd site was not included in the settlement. Id. The settlement was similar to one reached by
Wal-Mart and contractors in 2001, which required Wal-Mart to pay $1 million for violations. Id.
55. Mike Pare, Developer Says Problems at Wal-Mart Site Fixed, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS
(Tenn.), July 10, 2003, at C1.
56. The Citizens for Responsible Progress described themselves as “an organization of citizens and
public interest groups working to address the detrimental impact of development on health and the
environment" in the area. Injunction Halts Work at Super Wal-Mart at Brainerd, THE
CHATTANOOGAN.COM, July 7, 2003, http://www.chattanoogan.com/articles/article_38431.asp (last visited
Feb. 27, 2005).
57. Other named parties include Corker Group, Inc., Osborne Building Corporation, DBS Corporation,
and Wal-Mart Real Estate Business Trust. Tenn. Envtl. Council, Inc. v. Bright Par 3 Assocs., No. E200301982-COA-R3-CV, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 155, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2004).
58. Id. at *4.
59. Id.
60. Id. at *5. In Tennessee, the chancery court has “all the powers, privileges, and jurisdiction properly
and rightfully incident to a court of equity.” TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-11-101 (West, Westlaw through end
of 2005 First Reg. Sess.).
61. Tenn. Envtl. Council, Inc. v. Bright Par 3 Assocs., 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 155, at *5.
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was whether the individual plaintiff, Sandy Kurtz, had standing to maintain the
action.62 Kurtz testified that she was a devoted environmentalist dedicated to
preserving the protected property, that she had conducted nature walks on the property,
and “generally enjoy[ed] its solace and solitude.”63
The Chancellor found that Kurtz had suffered no injury “separate or different from
an injury that the public at large . . . sustained,” and that under Tennessee law she
lacked standing to file the action.64 The Chancellor also found that only the grantee of
the easement, the City of Chattanooga, had standing to enforce the easement, and
dismissed the action.65
The Council appealed to the Court of Appeals of Tennessee,66 arguing that either
the Council or Kurtz had standing to bring the enforcement action.67 In the meantime,
however, construction continued on the Wal-Mart Supercenter.68 As the issue on
appeal was a matter of law, there was no presumption of correctness, and the court of
appeals reviewed the record de novo.69 The court began by examining the language of
the Tennessee Conservation Easement Act,70 which provides that “conservation
easements may be enforced by injunction, proceedings in equity, or action at law
[either] by the holders and/or beneficiaries of the easement, or their bona fide
representatives, heirs, or assigns.”71 The court, in trying to determine the legislative
intent of the Easement Act, found that the inclusion of “beneficiaries” as permissible
enforcers must be read as meaning “someone in addition to the grantee.”72 The court

62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at *6. The Chancellor was apparently relying on established Tennessee law governing the issue
of standing. See id. at *6 n.4; Metro. Air Research Testing Auth., Inc. v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 842
S.W.2d 611, 615 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) (declaring that standing requires that a party demonstrate “(1) that
it sustained a distinct and palpable injury, (2) that the injury was caused by the challenged conduct, and
(3) that the injury is apt to be redressed by a remedy that the court is prepared to give.”). In Metro. Air, the
Court of Appeals of Tennessee relied on both Tennessee law and on relevant United States Supreme Court
decisions in order to define what is required in order to show standing. Id. The three prongs that the court
referred to were taken from Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984).
65. Tenn. Envtl. Council, Inc. v. Bright Par 3 Assocs., 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 155, at *6. The
Chancellor described his interpretation of the instrument as follows:
Paragraph 5 [of the easement] . . . sets out the grantee's remedies. It says this easement may
be enforced by its holder or beneficiary. Grantee may bring an action for any remedies
provided by Tennessee law. So the deed . . . that creates the easement says the grantee, the
City of Chattanooga, is the one who has the right to pursue for a remedy provided by law.
The easement is created for the benefit of the citizens of Chattanooga, but they are not
designated as beneficiaries. They are not the grantee of the easement. The City of
Chattanooga is.
Id. at *7.
66. The Court of Appeals of Tennessee is an intermediate appellate court that generally has jurisdiction
over most civil appeals. TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-4-108 (West, Westlaw through end of 2005 First Reg.
Sess.).
67. Tenn. Envtl. Council, Inc. v. Bright Par 3 Assocs., 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 155, at *6.
68. Court OKs Suit Against Brainerd Wal-Mart, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS (Tenn.), Mar. 9,
2004, at B3.
69. Tenn. Envtl. Council, Inc. v. Bright Par 3 Assocs., 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 155, at *6.
70. Id. at *7.
71. Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-9-307 (West, Westlaw through end of 2005 First Reg. Sess.).
72. Tenn. Envtl. Council, Inc. v. Bright Par 3 Assocs., 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 155, at *7-8.
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then looked to the dictionary meaning of beneficiary, and went back to the statute to
determine that conservation easements are “held for the benefit of the people of
Tennessee.”73 Completing the analysis, the court held, therefore, that any citizen of
Tennessee was a beneficiary to the easement and thus had standing to bring an
enforcement action.74 The court found that this interpretation was consistent with the
liberal construction necessary to give the Act its proper effect and purpose.75 Further,
the court legitimized its interpretation by pointing out the fact that the legislature
refused to adopt the language of the Uniform Conservation Easement Act, which did
not contain an explicit provision allowing for enforcement by beneficiaries.76
The court refused to issue any ruling on the merits of the case, and with the issue
of standing thus decided, the judgment of dismissal was reversed and the case
remanded to the chancery court.77 Although Bright Par 3 Associates appealed the
ruling, the Supreme Court of Tennessee denied the application of appeal.78
V. CULTIVATING THEORIES FOR CITIZEN ENFORCEMENT
Tennessee Environmental Council v. Bright Par presents an expansive view of the
doctrine of standing to confer enforcement powers on citizens for conservation
easements. As the court somewhat understatedly noted, the Tennessee statute is
broader than the UCEA and, in fact, is unlike any other statute in the country in
providing for beneficiary enforcement.79 Not only that, the decision went much farther
than any existing case law on the issue in defining the beneficiary of a conservation
easement to include any citizen of the state of Tennessee. What the Tennessee case
shows, however, is that there is a possibility under many state statutes for citizen
enforcement of conservation easements if courts are willing to construe statutes
liberally in order to give the statutes the effect intended by the legislatures.
One major way broader citizen enforcement power may be accomplished is
through a mechanism provided in most state statutes, especially those following the
UCEA, for enforcement actions to be brought by “a person authorized by other law.”80

73. Id. (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-9-303 (West, Westlaw through end of 2005 First Reg. Sess.)).
74. Id. at *8.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at *9. The court also denied the request of Wal-Mart Real Estate Business Trust that it consider
the issue of whether dismissal of the complaint as against it was proper even if the plaintiffs had the
requisite standing. Id. at *9-10. The court declined to do so for two reasons: “First, the Chancellor did not
rule on the specific issue, and secondly, it would be meaningless dictum for us to do so.” Id. at *10.
78. Tenn. Envtl. Council v. Bright Par 3 Assocs., No. E2003-01982-SC-R11-CV, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS
1200 (Tenn. Oct. 4, 2004).
79. Compare TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-9-303 (West, Westlaw through end of 2005 First Reg. Sess.
2004), with UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 3 (1981). Although some state enabling statutes
provide broader standing rules than the UCEA, none are as explicitly as broad as the Tennessee statute.
See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1013 (West, Westlaw through end of the 2005 Regular Session) (providing
for standing by the “local government in which the real property is located”).
80. UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 3(a)(4). The states with this or similar provision in their
enabling legislation include Alaska (ALASKA STAT. § 34.17.020 (West, Westlaw through all 2004 Sessions,
Annotations through Opinions Decided as of September 17, 2004)), Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33273 (West, westlaw through end of the Forty-Seventh Legislature, First Regular Session (2005))), Arkansas
(ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-20-409 (West, Westlaw through 2005 Regular Session. Revisions to Acts from the
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By using the language of state statutes and a variety of theories of enforcement, there
is a potential in many states to allow citizens to enforce conservation easements.
Citizens will often be the first to know if land protected by a conservation easement is
threatened. Provided that they know that a conservation easement exists on a parcel
in their community, citizens can potentially monitor the land much more frequently and
comprehensively than perhaps a small land trust could.81 If the land appears threatened,
the citizen could notify the holder or landowner and, with a well-reasoned argument
for standing, could even enforce the terms of the easement in court.
Given the fact that the use of conservation easements has become standard
practice across the nation, it makes little sense to have such an expansive rule of
standing in one state, while just next door, a different state takes a much more
restrictive approach. This is especially problematic considering that many of the
statutes are based on the UCEA, the same land trust might hold easements in a number
of different states, the public policy behind the easements are similar, the public benefit
is often comparable, and the very instruments creating the conservation easements
might have very similar provisions.82 The court in Bright Par defined a solid standing

2005 Regular Session made by the Arkansas Code Revision Commission were unavailable at time of
publication)), Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6903 (West, Westlaw through the First Regular Session
of the 143rd General Assenmbly)), Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 704.06 (West, Westlaw through Chapter
352 and H.J.R. No. 1723, H.J.R. 1177 and S.J.R. No. 2144 (End) of the 2005 First Regular Session of the
Nineteenth Legislature)), Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 44-10-4 (West, Westlaw through end of the 2005
Regular Session)), Idaho (IDAHO CODE Ann. § 55-2103 (West, Westlaw through the 2005 Legislative
Session)), Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. § 32-23-5-6 (West, Westlaw through the 2005 First Regular Session)),
Kansas (KANS. STAT. ANN. § 58-3812 (West, Westlaw through the 2004 Regular Session)), Kentucky (KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 382.820 (West, Westlaw through end of 2004 First Extraordinary Session)), Louisiana
(LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1274 (West, Westlaw through all 2004 First Extraordinary and Regular Session
Acts)), Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 84C.03 (West, Westlaw through laws of the 2005 Regular Session
except Chapters 136 and 151, effective through July 1, 2005)), Mississippi (MISS. CODE ANN. § 89-19-7
(West, Westlaw through end of 2005 Reg. and 1st Ex. Sess.)), Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 111.430
(West, Westlaw through the 2004 21st Special Session of the 72nd Legislature and the 2004 Revisions by
the Legislative Counsel Bureau)), Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 49.4 (West, Westlaw through
chapters of the 2005 First Regular Session effective through September 1, 2005)), Oregon (OR. REV. STAT.
Ann. § 271.755 (West, Westlaw through end of the 2003 Reg. Sess.)), Pennsylvania (32 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 5055 (West, Westlaw through Act 2005-2)), South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-8-40 (West,
Westlaw through end of 2004 Reg. Sess.)), Texas (TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 183.003 (West, Westlaw
through the end of the 2005 Regular Session of the 79th Legislature)), Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 10.11013 (West, Westlaw through end of the 2005 Regular Session)), West Virginia (W. VA. CODE ANN. § 2012-5 (West, Westlaw through end of 2005 Third Ex. Sess.)), and Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 700.40
(West, Westlaw through 2005 Act 21, published 7/22/05)). Note that many statutes that do not have this
language are simply silent on the issue, and therefore liberal enforcement arguments may also have a chance
in those states.
81. Again, many small land trusts that hold conservation easements, although very dedicated and
passionate about land protection, simply do not have the funding to ensure comprehensive monitoring of
the properties, let alone the funding necessary to engage in expensive and time-consuming enforcement
litigation. Valid arguments exist to make that a more expansive doctrine of standing will only lead to more
litigation, which in turn will lead to higher costs and burdens on land trusts and on conservation easements
in general. Until more courts deal with the issue of standing and decide whether to expand the doctrine or
not, dealing with those arguments at this point seems premature.
82. Indeed, there has been a good deal of momentum in recent years for standardization of practices
both within individual states, as well as among the many states, led in large part by national organizations
such as the Land Trust Alliance.
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rule that will likely help to ensure the public benefit of easements for generations, and
other courts should follow the precedent, crafting rules that fit within the given state
enabling statutes.
Accordingly, the first step in evaluating a citizen-enforcement action83 is to look
at the language of the state enabling statute to determine whether a broad citizenstanding provision was specifically adopted, or otherwise intended by the state
legislature. Although in most states there is no explicit provision granting broad
citizen standing, some states do automatically grant standing to parties other than the
holder or landowner. For example, the Illinois enabling statute grants enforcement
power to any person owning real property within 500 feet of the land subject to the
conservation easement.84
Many state enabling statutes allow for third-party enforcement provisions to be
included in the terms of the easement.85 If this is so, the next step would be to look at
the easement document itself, which may grant a third-party right of enforcement. It
is unlikely that third-party enforcement provisions will benefit citizen-enforcers,
however, given the standard requirement that the third-party enforcer be qualified to
be a holder of easements.86 Because individuals generally cannot qualify as holders,
there would be no ability to grant a third-party enforcement right to citizens. The
exception may be in states that do not have a third-party enforcement provision in the
enabling statute; in this case, it may be possible to draft a third-party enforcement right
into the instrument regardless of statutory silence. In these states, perhaps it would be
possible to grant a third-party enforcement right to the citizens of [state], as
beneficiaries of the conservation easement.87
If the statute is ambiguous,88 or allows, as most do, for enforcement by persons
authorized under “any other law,” the citizen-enforcer has a number of options for
arguments that would provide for standing to bring the enforcement action: (i) the

83. The term “citizen-enforcer,” as used in this Note, is intended to indicate, generally, someone other
than the holder of the easement, the owner of the encumbered land, or a government organization.
84. See 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 120/4 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 94-259 of the 2005 Reg.
Sess.).
85. See UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 1(3) (1981). “Despite the lack of statutory authority
for third-party enforcement rights in many states, the use of third-party enforcement rights appears
widespread throughout the nation.” Todd D. Mayo, A Holistic Examination of the Law of Conservation
Easements, in PROTECTING THE LAND: CONSERVATION EASEMENTS PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 50 (Julie
Ann Gustanski & Roderick H. Squires eds., 2000).
86. UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 1(3) (1981).
87. There is no evidence of this sort of drafting, and, although suggested hypothetically here, it may
not be advisable to include such a provision, given that such a clause could open up the holder of the
easement to any number of lawsuits concerning the easement.
88. Professor Nancy McLaughlin argues that even if the statute is unambiguous, then:
[I]n the case of a conservation easement donated to a government agency or charitable
organization, the stated purpose of which is the protection of certain conservation attributes
of the encumbered land forever or in perpetuity, and that grants the donee the discretion to
amend the easement only in manners consistent with its stated purpose, the equitable rules
governing a donee’s use and disposition of charitable assets should apply in addition or as
an overlay to the provisions in the easement enabling statute addressing modification or
termination.
Nancy A. McLaughlin, Rethinking the Perpetual Nature of Conservation Easements, 29 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 421, 450 (2005)(emphasis added).
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citizen may look to the common law to make analogies to standing rules based on
classic servitudes, (ii) the citizen may rely on the “charitable trust” doctrine, which
grants standing to the state attorney general as a representative of the public, a cotrustee, and any party with a “special interest” in the performance of a charitable trust,
and (iii) the citizen could look to federal environmental laws to make an overarching
policy argument for citizen enforcement of important publicly beneficial environmental
policy, especially in the absence of governmental action.89
Under any of these theories, the fundamental element of a successful standing
argument for citizen-enforcement of a conservation easement would be a strong
showing of public benefit. In many situations, a showing of public benefit may be
possible by reference to the state enabling statute, many of which directly evidence the
legislature’s assumption that an easement provides benefits to the public.90 If the
protected land specifically provides for public access, the public benefit would be
apparent from the face of the conservation easement instrument.91 Additionally, a
citizen plaintiff may make reference to the federal tax code, which requires that an
“open space” easement “yield a significant public benefit.”92 In Bright Par, the court
had little problem finding a public benefit because of the clear language of the statute
declaring that conservation easements are held for the benefit of the public.93
The following sections discuss the three arguments that a citizen may make in
asserting standing to enforce a conservation easement.
A. The Common Law
The early common law rules that governed what are now known generally as
“servitudes”94 were rather restrictive on issues of enforcement powers. It is fair to say,

89. See supra note 24 and accompanying text for a case in which this argument was attempted.
90. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-39-1 (West, Westlaw through January 2004 Session) (“The purpose
of this chapter is to grant a special legal status to conservation restrictions . . . . [and] to provide the people
of Rhode Island with the continued diversity of history and landscape that is unique to this state without
great expenditures of public funds.”).
91. Obviously, the issue of public access on conservation easement lands is a complex one. Many
governmental easement holders either require, or at least strongly prefer public access on the land that they
acquire. On the other hand, public access may directly contravene the conservation purposes of an
easement. These issues become particularly difficult when, for example, easements are acquired by
governments on land that has traditionally been used for hunting, or in areas that depend on snowmobile
recreation; the structure of the easements often comes down to a delicate balancing of the interests of
multiple parties. Even the IRS regulations recognize this inherent conflict where an easement provides for
habitat protection. The IRS regulations provide that:
[L]imitations on public access to property that is the subject of a donation under this
paragraph (d)(3) shall not render the donation nondeductible. For example, a restriction on
all public access to the habitat of a threatened native animal species protected by a donation
under this paragraph (d)(3) would not cause the donation to be nondeductible.
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d)-3(iii) (2005).
92. I.R.C. § 170(h)(4)(A) (2005).
93. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-9-303(1)(A)(i) (West, Westlaw through end of 2005 First Reg. Sess.)
(describing a conservation easement as an easement that “[i]s held for the benefit of the people of
Tennessee”).
94. The Restatement now groups many of the common law interests in land, which traditionally came
in many different forms, under the unifying “servitude” label:
This Restatement presents a comprehensive modern treatment of the law of servitudes that
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however, that the restrictive rules that govern servitudes have been relaxed. Upon
reflection, it is hard to pin down one particular common law theory that forms the
complete basis for the evolution of conservation easements. Although labeled an
“easement” in most jurisdictions (a conservation “restriction” in others),95 they share
fewer characteristics with traditional common law easements than they do with other
servitudes.
If modern conservation easements were, in fact, “easements,” under a common law
theory they would likely be described in a rather cumbersome manner as “negative
easements in gross,” which were of questionable validity under common law theories.96
According to English law, only four types of negative easements were allowed by the
courts, and those easements were appurtenant in nature; a landowner could keep his
neighbor from “1) blocking [his] windows, 2) interfering with air flowing to [his] land
. . . , 3) removing the support of [his] building . . . , and 4) interfering with the flow of
water in an artificial stream.”97 According to the theory of negative easements,
generally the only person who would have standing to enforce an easement would be
the owner of the appurtenant estate, because he would be the only person who could
make a showing of some sort of injury as a result of the violation of the easement.
On the other hand, if conservation easements were considered to fall under the
common law of real covenants, it is probable that any enforcement actions would be
unsuccessful because the majority rule was that real covenants with benefits in gross
could not run.98 Although there were courts that allowed these types of covenants to
be enforced, the covenants were more often than not more akin to appurtentant benefits
than benefits in gross.99 In recent years, however, there have been courts willing to use
real covenant contract theories to enforce benefits in gross;100 as of yet, these enforcement actions have only been initiated by parties to the original contract (the “easement”
holders).
Finally, there is the theory of equitable servitudes, which is probably closest in
most ways to the modern conservation easement. The most widely cited case for this

substantially simplifies and clarifies one of the most complex and archaic bodies of 20th
century American law. Treating the law of easements, profits, and covenants as an integrated
body of doctrine, this Restatement eliminates needless distinctions, archaic terminology, and
obsolete requirements. It is designed to allow both traditional and innovative landdevelopment practices using servitudes without imposing artificial constraints as to form or
arbitrary limitations as to substance.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SERVITUDES, Introduction to Volume 1 (2000).
95. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 31 (West 2003).
96. But see United States v. Blackman, 613 S.E.2d 442, 449 (2005) (holding that a negative easement
in gross, created more than a decade before the enactment of the Virginia Conservation Easement Act was
valid).
97. JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 855 (5th ed. 2002).
98. See Korngold, supra note 12, at 470-73.
99. See id. at 473-76. Korngold discusses the case of Inhabitants of Middlefield v. Church Mills
Knitting Co., 35 N.E. 780 (1894), in which Justice Holmes recognized, “that when servitudes in gross fill
a particular public need, they merit enforcement rather than an inflexible denial based on precedent.” Id.
at 476.
100. See, e.g., Bagley v. Found. for the Pres. of Historic Georgetown, 647 A.2d 1110 (D.C. 1994)
(enforcing the terms of a historic preservation easement through a traditional contract theory; the group
bringing the enforcement action was the holder of the easement).
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doctrine is the English case of Tulk v. Moxhay.101 In that case, the court of chancery
issued an injunction against a property owner who had been conveyed a deed that
contained a prohibition against the erection of any buildings.102 Most courts required
(and may still require) an appurtenant benefit in order to enforce an equitable
servitude.103
In general, the common law provided strict rules on enforceability of servitudes,
requiring showings of privity, notice, and benefits in order for a party to have standing.
Under a more modern view, according to the Restatement (Third) of Servitudes, “[a]
person who holds the benefit of a servitude under any provision of this Restatement has
a legal right to enforce the servitude.”104 Both the language of the Restatement and the
comment make clear that the intent of the rule was to eliminate the common law
restriction that gave standing only to those who owned the land “intended to benefit
from enforcement.”105 The common law rule was a result of the general prohibition
against covenant benefits in gross.106 The Restatement does provide, however, that
anyone who holds the benefit of a covenant in gross is required to show “a legitimate
interest in enforcing the covenant.”107 The comment to the rule further clarifies this rule
as it relates to conservation servitudes:
Some covenant benefits in gross . . . are similar to appurtenant benefits in providing
valuable benefits that are difficult to monetize and difficult or impossible to replace.
To establish a legitimate interest in the enforcement of such covenant, the beneficiary
need not establish that he or she will suffer economic harm from covenant violation,
but rather, that he or she seeks enforcement to advance the purpose for which the
servitude was created.108

Most conservation servitudes, being held by a governmental body or a conservation
organization, would also fall under the rule described in the Restatement that provides
that a conservation servitude “is enforceable by coercive remedies and other relief
designed to give full effect to the purpose of the servitude.”109 The rationale behind this
permissive view of enforcement remedies is the “strong public interest in conservation
servitudes.”110 Of course, the Restatement just outlines the general common law rules
governing servitudes; as it notes, most states have enacted statutory provisions
explicitly dealing with enforcement, the most common model for legislative enactment
being the UCEA.
But the UCEA also provides that enforcement actions may be brought by “a
person authorized by other law,” and additionally notes that the traditional common
law restrictions associated with servitudes will not cause a conservation easement to

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (1848).
Id. at 1143.
See Dana & Ramsey, supra note 8, at 17.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SERVITUDES § 8.1 (2000).
Id. § 8.1, cmt. a.
Id.
Id. § 8.1.
Id. § 8.1, cmt. c.
Id. § 8.5, cmt. a.
Id.

242

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:1

fail.111 The modern trend, as evidenced by the Restatement and the UCEA, is to do
away with the common law rules that called into question the validity and enforceability of many servitudes.112 Armed with the developing legal doctrines in this area,
a citizen-enforcer may have a number of arguments for a broader theory of standing.
It does not make sense, legally, that a neighboring landowner cannot enforce a
conservation easement on his neighbor’s land simply because the “benefits” are
deemed to be “in gross.” After Bright Par, a citizen in Tennessee may now enforce a
conservation easement against a landowner halfway across the state, while a citizen in
another state may not be able to enforce the terms of a conservation easement against
his neighbor, even where the neighbor will likely suffer more “harm” or “injury” as a
result of the violations. A neighboring landowner will usually gain “appurtenant”
benefits that are equal to or greater than general benefits “in gross,” in the form of
scenic views, increase in property values, recreational opportunities, and others.
On the other hand, it may be beneficial in some instances to revert to a more traditional common law argument to argue for enforcement power. For example, in the
case of an easement granted as a condition to subdivision of land, one landowner trying
to enforce the terms of the easement against another may try to analogize the conservation easement to a reciprocal negative easement.113 Under this common law
theory, the easement would be enforceable by one neighbor as against the other; by
arguing that the easement fit into this common law category, a broader enforcement
power might actually be granted than would otherwise be allowed from a strict interpretation of the conservation easement statute.
B. The Charitable Trust Theory
Commentators have advanced one prominent additional theory of standing for
enforcement actions; it focuses on the treatment of the conservation easement as a
“charitable trust” and hinges on the role of state Attorneys General as supervisors of
charitable trusts on behalf of the public.114 Unfortunately, due to the relative novelty

111. The UCEA provides:
A conservation easement is valid even though:
(1) it is not appurtenant to an interest in real property;
(2) it can be or has been assigned to another holder;
(3) it is not of a character that has been recognized traditionally at common law;
(4) it imposes a negative burden;
(5) it imposes affirmative obligations upon the owner of an interest in the burdened
property or upon the holder;
(6) the benefit does not touch or concern real property; or
(7) there is no privity of estate or of contract.
UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 4 (1981).
112. See United States v. Blackman, 613 S.E.2d 442, 446-47 (Va. 2005) (finding that Virginia had long
recognized the public benefit of negative easements in gross and had therefore abandoned the common law
restrictions on transferability).
113. See Sanborn v. McLean, 206 N.W. 496, 497 (Mich. 1926) (finding a negative reciprocal easement
where one neighbor tried to build a gas station in a residential neighborhood).
114. See Alexander R. Arpad, Private Transactions, Public Benefits, and Perpetual Control Over the
Use of Real Property: Interpreting Conservation Easements as Charitable Trusts, 37 REAL PROP. PROB.
& TR. J. 91 (2002) (suggesting that a conservation easement is substantially similar to a charitable trust, and
evaluating the consequences of this treatment); Cheever, supra note 8, at 1101 (“The obvious ‘public’
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of conservation easements, there has been little opportunity to put this theory to the test
in actual litigation.
The “charitable trust” theory of conservation easement enforcement was outlined
in a comment to the UCEA.115 The drafters discuss the doctrine of cy pres116 as it
relates to charitable trusts, and states that the act “leaves intact the existing case and
statute law of adopting states as it relates to the modification and termination of
easements and the enforcement of charitable trusts.”117 According to the Restatement
(Second) of Trusts, a charitable trust is “a fiduciary relationship with respect to
property arising as a result of a manifestation of an intention to create it, and subjecting
the person by whom the property is held to equitable duties to deal with the property
for a charitable purpose.”118 Charitable trusts do not fail because the beneficiaries are
“indefinite”119 or because they may last for an “unlimited period.”120 This is one of the
main differences between a charitable trust and a private trust.121 The Attorney General
of a state, a co-trustee, or a person who has a “special interest” in enforcement has
standing to enforce the terms of a trust.122 Note that the mere fact that a person is a
possible beneficiary does not give him standing to enforce a charitable trust—this is
not sufficient to show a “special interest”123—and the settlor of the trust does not have
a power of enforcement, but may maintain a suit if the trust has failed.124
Most of these requirements square with the intent and purpose of a conservation
easement, which is why the theory of conservation easement as charitable trust has
been advocated. The public, in general, is typically thought of as a primary beneficiary
of a conservation easement, even though there is often no requirement that landowners

solution to the remaining problems is creation of a government right, and duty, to third-party enforcement
of easement conditions.”); Jeffrey M. Tapick, Note, Threats to the Continued Existence of Conservation
Easements, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 257, 289 (2002) (“If a court could be convinced that a conservation
easement is indeed a ‘charitable trust,’ then it could thwart an effort to terminate or release the easement
by ordering that the terms of the trust be enforced in equity.”).
115. UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 3, cmt. (1981).
116. Cy pres is a French phrase, meaning “as near as;” it is an equitable doctrine whereby a court will
reform a gift to a charity as closely to the donor’s intention as possible, in order to prevent the gift from
failing. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 392 (7th ed. 1999).
117. UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 3, cmt. (1981) (“Under the doctrine of cy pres, if the
purposes of a charitable trust cannot be carried out . . . courts under their equitable powers may prescribe
terms and conditions that may best enable the general charitable objective to be achieved . . . . So, also, in
cases where a charitable trustee ceases to exist or cannot carry out its responsibilities, the court will appoint
a substitute trustee upon proper application and will not allow the trust to fail.”) For more on the charitable
trust theory and the doctrine of cy pres and how they relate to conservation easements, see McLaughlin,
supra note 87.
118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 348 (1959).
119. Id. § 364.
120. Id. § 365.
121. See Susan N. Gary, Regulating the Management of Charities: Trust Law, Corporate Law, and Tax
Law, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 593, 618 (1999) (“A charity organized as a trust does not have beneficiaries in
the sense that a private trust has beneficiaries.”).
122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 (1959).
123. Id. at 391 cmt. c. “The mere fact that as members of the public they benefit from the enforcement
of the trust is not sufficient ground to entitle them to sue, since a suit on their behalf can be maintained by
the Attorney General.” Id. cmt. d.
124. Id. at § 391, cmt. e, cmt. f.
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allow access to the burdened land by the public.125 The general enforcement provisions
of the UCEA, as mentioned above, give standing to enforce to the holder of the
easement (who assumes a role similar to a trustee),126 and, by operation of existing law,
to the state’s Attorney General. The UCEA differs from the general charitable trust
theory in allowing the landowner, essentially a settlor of the trust, to maintain an
action.127 Of course, state laws vary, and often differ considerably from both the
Restatement’s pronouncement of charitable trust law and the UCEA.
As an example, Tennessee, like many states, has now adopted the Uniform Trust
Code, which governs trust law within the state.128 Under that law, a charitable trust is
a trust created for “the advancement of education or religion, the promotion of health,
governmental or municipal purposes, or other purposes the achievement of which is
beneficial to the community.”129 If the trust does not indicate a charitable purpose or
beneficiary, “the court may select one (1) or more charitable purposes or beneficiaries”
that are “consistent with the settlor’s intention to the extent it can be ascertained.”130
Of significance for this discussion, the Uniform Trust Code provides that “[t]he settlor
of a charitable trust, among others, may maintain a proceeding to enforce the trust.”131
The comment to this section of the Code specifically recognizes that the provision is
contrary to that described in the Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 391.132 The phrase
“among others” was apparently included so as not to eliminate the traditional ability
of the “attorney general or persons with special interests to enforce either the trust or
their interests.”133
Although there is still some debate about whether state attorneys general may
enforce conservation easements under a charitable trust theory, it may be possible for
some citizens to have standing to enforce under the same doctrine. Under the common

125. Tapick, supra note 114, at 264 (“[T]he easement itself creates a benefit that is inherently public in
nature. The general public stands to gain from the achievement of an easement's conservation purpose . . . .
Indeed, each of the statutorily recognized conservation purposes of an easement is considered to be a public
benefit.”); John Walliser, Conservation Servitudes, 13 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 47, 86 (1997)
(“Considered against a backdrop of direct public and legislative support for conservation servitudes,
including favorable tax relief at both the state and federal level, there is definitive evidence that
conservation servitudes have recognized public benefit.”). Courts have also gone along with this view. See
Bennett v. Comm'r of Food & Agric., 576 N.E.2d 1365, 1367 (Mass. 1991) (upholding enforcement of a
conservation easement “[w]here the beneficiary of the restriction is the public and the restriction reinforces
a legislatively stated public purpose”).
126. See Arpad, supra note 114 at 91 (discussing the elements of charitable trusts, the fiduciary
relationship created by a charitable trust, and how this relates to the theories underlying a conservation
easement).
127. The UCEA grants standing to an owner of an interest in the land, which may not necessarily be the
donor if the donor transfers that interest to another party.
128. TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-15-101 (West, Westlaw through end of 2005 First Reg. Sess.). Note that
the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code became effective on July 1, 2004, a few months after the decision in
Tenn. Envtl. Council, Inc. v. Bright Par 3 Ass’n was handed down. 2004 Tenn. Pub. Acts 537. The law
is simply used for discussion purposes here; obviously, after Bright Par, citizens of Tennessee would not
have to resort to this theory in order to enforce a conservation easement.
129. TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-15-405(a) (West, Westlaw through end of 2005 First Reg. Sess.).
130. Id. § 35-15-405(b).
131. Id. § 35-15-405(c).
132. Id. § 35-15-405, cmt.
133. Id.
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law, as well as the Restatement (Second) of Trusts and the Uniform Trust Code,
beneficiaries with a special interest in the charitable trust have standing to enforce the
trust. Arguably, citizens that can make a strong showing of public benefit, and perhaps
even a showing of personal benefit, may be entitled to enforce a conservation easement
under this theory. Exactly what would be needed to show a “special interest” is not
clear, and will likely have to be determined through judicial decisions. Perhaps, after
Bright Par, where the term “beneficiary” was specifically used and given an expansive
meaning, citizens of other states may argue that their status as a citizen of that state and
as a “beneficiary” of the conservation easement satisfies the “special interest” test
sufficiently to allow standing to enforce.
C. Citizen Standing in Federal Environmental Laws
The requirement of standing is a threshold test for any person wishing for judicial
enforcement through the courts. In recent decades, the law of standing has played out
more in the environmental law context than perhaps in any other area. Environmental
law lends itself well to citizen involvement and enforcement.134 Particularly at the
federal level, a showing of standing has become a necessary inclusion in a well-drafted
complaint as well as a capable sword in the hands of legal defense. Although citizen
enforcers of conservation easements generally will not look to federal environmental
law for a specific grant of standing, a decision to grant standing may be effectively
supported by arguments concerning the national policy of environmental laws.
Citizen enforcement of environmental laws attained its first milestone during the
mid-1960s in the Storm King case.135 The case involved a proposed project by
Consolidated Edison to put a huge reservoir on top of Storm King Mountain along the
Hudson River, which would have generated electricity for New York City during peak
load periods, and would have involved drawing 1,080,000 cubic feet of water per
minute from the Hudson, and discharging 1,620,000 cubic feet of water per minute into
the river when generating.136 Conservation groups and affected towns joined together
and sued the Federal Power Commission under section 313(b) of the Federal Power
Act.137 The Federal Power Commission argued that the citizen groups did not have
standing to bring the suit because they had no claim of personal economic injury.138
Judge Hays for the Second Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this argument, stating that
those persons who, through their behavior, have established a special interest in “the
aesthetic, conservational, and recreational aspects of power development . . . must be

134. See generally ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW,
398-428 (3rd ed. 2004).
135. Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965). The Storm
King case is well-documented in ALLAN R. TALBOT, POWER ALONG THE HUDSON: THE STORM KING CASE
AND THE BIRTH OF ENVIRONMENTALISM (1972).
136. Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 354 F.2d at 612.
137. Id. at 611. Section 313(b) of the Act reads: “Any party to a proceeding under this chapter aggrieved
by an order issued by the Commission in such proceeding may obtain a review of such order in the United
States court of appeals for any circuit wherein the licensee or public utility to which the order relates is
located . . . .” 16 U.S.C. § 8251(b) (2000).
138. Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 354 F.2d at 615.
AND SOCIETY
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held to be included in the class of ‘aggrieved’ parties under § 313(b).”139 Furthermore,
the court stated that “[a] party acting as a ‘private attorney general’ can raise issues that
are not personal to it.”140
The Storm King case was followed a few years later by Judge Skelley Wright’s
bold declaration, in the context of a citizen suit against the Atomic Energy
Commission, that one of the court’s duties was to “see that important legislative
purposes, heralded in the halls of Congress, are not lost or misdirected in the vast
hallways of the federal bureaucracy.”141
In 1972, the Supreme Court issued an opinion that expanded judicial standing for
citizen suits in Sierra Club v. Morton.142 The case involved a challenge by the Sierra
Club of a development proposal on national forest public lands by the Walt Disney
Corporation.143 In addressing a challenge to the standing of the Sierra Club to bring
suit, the Court observed, “[a]esthetic and environmental well-being, like economic
well-being, are important ingredients of the quality of life in our society, and the fact
that particular environmental interests are shared by the many rather than the few does
not make them less deserving of legal protection through the judicial process.”144
However, the Court held that “the party seeking review [must] be himself among the
injured.”145 Accordingly, the Court rejected a “private attorney general” theory, denying standing to environmental groups unless they could show that members of the
group would be harmed by the action.146 Justice Douglas, in his dissent advocated for
the adoption of a federal rule that would grant standing to “inanimate object[s] about
to be despoiled, defaced, or invaded by roads and bulldozers . . . where injury is the
subject of public outrage.”147
During the 1970s, as Congress was enacting most of the nation’s major federal
environmental laws, it appeared as though citizen suits had garnered a strong position
in the field. Many of the statutes enacted contained explicit citizen-suit provisions: the
Endangered Species Act,148 the Clean Water Act,149 the Safe Drinking Water Act,150
and the Clean Air Act151 all contain such provisions, just to name a few.
Then, beginning in the 1980s, the Supreme Court appeared to retreat from the
more expansive view of standing that it had espoused just a few years earlier. In

139. Id. at 616.
140. Id. at 619.
141. Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir.
1971). The Calvert Cliffs’ case was a milestone in early NEPA litigation, a signal to federal agencies that
the requirements of NEPA would have to be taken seriously. “In short, Congress placed the ambitious
environmental statutes on the books in the 1970s, but it was the judiciary, led by judges like Judge Skelly
Wright, who made it actually happen. They invited and spurred the filing of environmental citizen suits.”
Richard J. Lazarus, Judging Environmental Law, 18 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 201, 211 (2004).
142. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
143. Id. at 729-30.
144. Id. at 734.
145. Id. at 735.
146. Id. at 739-41 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 741.
148. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(2000).
149. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2000).
150. 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (2000).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2000).
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Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc.,152 the Court strictly
construed the Clean Water Act’s citizen-suit provision to deny standing to a citizen
group challenging illegal discharges by a swine-processing plant.153 The Court held
that a citizen suit could only proceed in the face of an ongoing violation or proof of
future likelihood of violations.154
In its opinions during the early 1990s the Court required showings of highly
particularized injuries to environmental plaintiffs in order to obtain standing.155 The
Court denied standing to a citizen’s group after plaintiffs alleged harm to their
“recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment” of an area of land, finding that the affidavits
only stated use of a small portion of the “immense tract of territory” at issue.156 The
Court also denied citizen standing under the Endangered Species Act, even in the face
of statutory language that granted an enforcement right to “any person” because the
plaintiffs did not show that their injury would be “imminent.”157
In an unexpected turn, however, the Court upheld a citizen’s right to enforce
violations of a Clean Water Act permit in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc.158 The Court found that the actions of the polluter directly
affected the citizen plaintiffs’ “recreational, aesthetic, and economic interests.”159 It
went on to hold that the State’s settlement with the polluter did not bar the citizen
action,160 the injuries were redressable by the suit,161 and the issue was not moot.162
The Supreme Court’s environmental standing jurisprudence shows a recognition
that when a citizen is sufficiently harmed by the actions of a party violating the
environmental laws of the country, a liberal interpretation of standing doctrine is often
necessary to redress those harms. It has been the policy of Congress, since the 1970s,
to allow citizens to enforce important environmental laws when other enforcement
mechanisms do not effectively address the problem. The problem presented when an
easement holder either refuses to or is unable to enforce a conservation easement is
similar, in many respects, to a state refusing to enforce the requirements of the Clean
Air Act or other environmental statute. In both cases, it is the public (who depends on
government to act on their behalf and for their benefit) that loses out. If a town is
unwilling to enforce the terms of an easement because of various political pressures the
easement will be lost and the conservation values destroyed. The public subsidy will
cease producing returns. Given the national scope of conservation easement use and
acceptance, the analogy between conservation easements statutes and the federal-based
environmental statutes is not a stretch. If citizens can sufficiently allege specific
injuries that will result from the breach of a conservation easement provision, they

152. 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
153. Id. at 60-61.
154. Id. at 57-59.
155. See Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555 (1992).
156. Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. at 886, 89.
157. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 571-2, 578.
158. 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
159. Id. at 184.
160. Id. at 177-78, 189.
161. Id. at 185-188.
162. Id. at 189-94.
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should be allowed to defend the terms of the easement if other parties with enforcement
powers are unwilling or unable to do so. In the conservation easement context, a
factual showing of some sort of individual benefit, such as recreation, aesthetic, or
economic interest, derived from the use of easement-protected land, and a subsequent
frustration of that benefit due to easement violations, will help the plaintiff establish
a sufficient injury that should be allowed to be redressed through court action.
VI. CONCLUSION
The continuing validity of conservation easements depends, in large part, on the
ability of those with an interest in conservation to enforce the terms of the easements.
Enforcement case law thus far has come out in a number of different directions
concerning the fundamental question of who may enforce a conservation easement. In
order to ensure that conservation easements last in perpetuity, courts should give
liberal construction to enforcement provisions in order to carry out the policy
objectives behind conservation easement statutes. One example of this interpretation
was seen in Bright Par, where the court liberally construed the word “beneficiary” to
include all citizens of the state of Tennessee. Where statutory language is not as clear,
however, there are a number of possible legal frameworks that would allow broad
citizen enforcement of conservation easements. It is necessary that courts allow
broader enforcement powers in order to protect the public benefits of conservation
easements, lest those benefits be lost forever.
Sean P. Ociepka

